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Abstract 
Each year the latest information security surveys are released to the computing and business communities. 
Often their findings and their methodologies are subject to criticism from the information security community, 
professional bodies and others in the profession. This paper looks at the viewpoints of both the producers and 
the critics of the surveys. The criticisms cover such issues as the methodologies, the response rates, the 
experience of the respondents, the design of the questions and the interpretation of the results. This paper looks 
at these issues and discusses the validity of these criticisms, the impact of the surveys and their value to business 
and government. It compares the methodologies of some of the largest local and international players in the 
area. It discusses the issues arising from flawed methodologies, inaccurate information and poor processes, 
including the perceived lack of integrity and the accuracy of the measurements and methodologies. Despite the 
strong criticism a middle ground emerged. Data input by the participants, whether accurate or not, may be 
highly subjective and influenced by their environment and business profile. Furthermore, security at a business 
level may be extremely complex, the governance principles dictating that the organisation profile, management 
ideologies and core business values must be accounted for and balanced even for IT. The paper also considers 
the interpretation of the results and how they may be influenced by current and future products and the vendors 
of those products. Finally the paper takes a closer look at the use of the surveys in a business context and 
attempts to show that if constructively used, these surveys can be powerful metric tools used in driving 
information security strategies in spite of their perceived deficiencies. 
Keywords 
Information security surveys, methodology, critics, business context, interpretation of results 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year the latest information security surveys are released to the computing and business communities. This 
event is usually characterised by frustration and anger throughout the information security profession. 
Information Security surveys can be a sensitive topic of discussion with some critics describing them as harmful 
(Walsh, 2006), whilst most of the others limit the scope of their criticism to the response rates, or lack of, and 
the managerial reluctance to divulge information (Emergent Chaos, 2006). 
This paper will present an overview of some of the more prominent Information Security surveys that are freely 
available on the Internet. The paper will review and compare their methodologies, target audience and the 
results of their measurements. The criticisms that they attract from the profession will be analysed in order to 
highlight the limitations affecting the surveys.  
SURVEY SELECTION 
Selection methods 
Security professionals use the statistics from these surveys for conferences, training and awareness campaigns 
(Theronsolutions, 2006). Observations, comments, interpretations and analysis of the security surveys have been 
posted on the Internet, prompting debate within the security community each year (Walsh, 2006). 
Before reviewing the surveys it was necessary to reduce the number of surveys reviewed to a manageable and 
representative selection. The selection of one survey over another can be highly subjective. To overcome this 
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issue a series of selection criteria were defined and applied to the different surveys. The following criteria were 
used in selecting the surveys used in this paper: 
The survey must: 
•  be directed specifically at Information Security risk; 
•  outline statistical measurements of the security items measured: 
• some surveys are advisory only and are limited to concluding arguments with regards 
to previously analysed measurements; 
• for the purpose of this paper, the survey must include the statistical information; 
• include a justification of the methodology and clearly state the nature of the respondents (eg IT 
managers); 
• have a minimum of three years existence and include in the presentation of the results a comparison to 
the previous years in order to assess the trends over the recent years; 
• be selected from sources representative of current security professionals including, but not limited to, 
vendors and industry leaders, independently mandated surveys and government reports. 
• the surveys must be freely available to the community. 
Note:  Both international and country specific surveys were considered.  
Methodologies 
The scope and depth of the information presented by each survey varies, rendering a comparison harder to 
make. 
The methodologies employed by the participants show similarities in the procedures taken to design, collect and 
review the questionnaires. 
In order to maximise the accuracy and fairness of the methodology review the information collection was 
limited to the following criteria: 
• audience surveyed; 
• dates and timelines associated with the surveys; 
• any available information regarding the design, collection and analysis of the information (i.e.: by 
whom, collection method, parties involved); 
• response rate. 
It is important to note that any information transcribed below is directly quoted from the associated survey. 
The following five surveys were selected for review. 
AusCERT: 2006 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey: 
The Australian High Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Police from NSW, 
QLD, SA, Tasmania, VIC, WA, Northern Territory and AusCERT have collaborated to produce this survey.  
The survey was funded by the Australian government’s Attorney-General’s Department and ACNielsen, a 
market research and information company, was engaged to assist with the preparation and administration of the 
survey.  
The survey was adapted from the 2006 CSI/FBI survey, providing the opportunity to compare Australian 
findings with the United States in some areas (AusCERT, 2006, p. 37). 
 
• The survey was deployed May 22, 2006 
• Respondent answers cover the 12 months period before January 2006. 
• Business reply-paid envelopes were sent to 2024 IT managers or their equivalents from a range of 
Australian public and private sector organizations. Those organizations were invited to complete the 
survey on-line or return the paper questionnaire via the reply-paid envelope. Responses were also 
sought from a number of private and public sector industry groups, including the Trusted Information 
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Sharing Network (TISN), whose members were invited to complete the survey via the secure web site. 
• Yielding 389 respondents (17% of response rate). 
• All responses were anonymous. 
• The acknowledged margin of error was not available. However, readers were warned that the format of 
the survey changed to increase the survey sample size; this should consequently be considered when 
assessing the respondent percentages against previous years. 
CSO Magazine: E-Crime Watch Survey 2006 
The 2006 E-Crime Watch survey was conducted by CSO magazine in cooperation with the U.S. Secret Service, 
Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute’s CERT® Coordination Centre and Microsoft 
Corporation (CSO, 2006, p. 1).  
 
• The survey was deployed June 28, 2006, through July 30, 2006.  
• Respondent answers cover the period between July 2005 and June 2006. 
• An e-mail invitation containing a link to the survey was sent to 15,000 CSO magazine readers (CSOs, 
security and law enforcement professionals); 
• Yielding 434 respondents (2.89% of response rate). 
• All responses were administered anonymously. 
• The acknowledged margin of error is +/- 3.4 percent.   
CSI/FBI: Computer Crime and Security Survey 
This survey is conducted by the CSI with the participation of the San Francisco Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) Computer Intrusion Squad. 
Its aim is to raise the level of security awareness, as well as help determine the scope of computer incidents in 
the United States (U.S.) (CSI/FBI, 2006, p. 1). 
 
• The survey was deployed early January 2006.  
• Respondent answers cover the year of 2006. 
• Hardcopy (fist-class mailing), and e-mail versions of the survey were distributed to 5000 information 
security practitioners in U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial institutions, medical 
institutions, and universities. 
• Yielding 616 respondents (12.3% of response rate). 
• All responses were administered anonymously. 
• The acknowledged margin of error was not available. 
Deloitte: 2006 Global Security Survey 
Deloitte is a private, global audit, tax, consulting, and financial advisory company. 
Their Global Security Survey provides benchmarks for IT security in the financial services industry. The goal of 
this survey is to gather information globally and it encompasses financial institutions with a worldwide presence 
and with head office operations in the determined geographical regions (Deloitte, 2006, p. 5). 
 
• The survey was deployed June 15, 2006.  
• Respondent answers cover the year of 2006. 
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• Data collection involved collection of both qualitative and quantitative data for related geographical 
areas. Each participating region was assigned and held accountable for obtaining answers. Most data 
collection took place through face-to-face interviews with the Chief Information Security Office/Chief 
Security Officer (CISO/CSO) or designate, or in some instances, the security management team. The 
option to submit answers online using an online questionnaire was given also. 
• 3-activity sectors were surveyed, accounting for 100 global financial institutions, 100 global banks, and 
50 global insurance companies. 
• This yielded 31 respondents amongst financial institutions surveyed (31% response rate), 34 
respondents amongst global banks surveyed  (34% response rate), and 16 respondents amongst global 
insurance companies surveyed (32% response rate) 
• Respondents’ anonymity was preserved by not identifying their organisations. 
• The acknowledged margin of error was not available. 
Department of Trade and Industry: Information Security Breaches Survey 2006 
The Information Security Breaches Survey 2006 is managed by PricewaterhouseCoopers on behalf of the U.K. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This biennial survey of U.K. businesses is the U.K.'s leading source of 
information on security incidents suffered by businesses, both large and small (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2006 p. 4). 
 
• The survey was deployed April 25, 2006. 
• The sample was randomly picked from a register of U.K. businesses; the contact person being 
identified as responsible for information security. A total of 1001 computer-assisted telephone 
interviews were conducted, each lasting on average 30 minutes. In addition, surveys were interactively 
run at a meeting of the Information Security Forum (ISF), providing an insight into security practices 
operating in very large businesses. Face-to-face in-depth interviews with information security officers 
were run, and finally, an e-mail pool was issued to InfoSecurity Europe subscribers. 
PrincewaterhouseCoopers managed the survey for the DTI and it was sponsored by Microsoft, 
Clearswift, Entrust and Symantec. 
• The number of respondents is unknown; the methodology however leads us to believe that the analysis 
was performed on a minimum of 1001 respondents, which made up for 100% response rate. 
• All responses were administered anonymously. 
• DFI acknowledge being 95% confident that the margin of error in their results is no more than +/- 3% 
percent. In addition, the point is made that with extreme results (towards 0% or 100%) the margin of 
error is reduced, whilst results analysed for a sub-sample (around +/- 1%) show that the margin of error 
is greater (large company statistics have a margin of error of no more than +/- 9%). Sampling error, 
question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into 
the findings. 
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Table 1 
Summary of the Sponsors, Managers, Participants and Methodologies for the Selected Surveys. 
 
Surveys AusCERT CSO CSI/FBI Deloitte DTI 
Country 
surveyed 
Australia U.K. U.S. Worldwide U.K. 
Profile Independent 
Non-profit 
Private Public 
association 
(CSI) /  
Government 
(FBI) 
Private Government 
Sponsors or 
cooperation 
by 
Managed by: 
ACNielsen 
Sponsored by:  
AFP and police 
from each state 
force, AHTCC, 
Attorney-
General’s 
Department 
Managed by:  
CSO & CERT 
Sponsored by: 
U.S. Secret 
Service, 
Carnegie 
Mellon 
University, 
Microsoft 
Managed by:  
Computer 
Security 
Institute (CSI) 
and the 
computer 
intrusion squad 
from San 
Francisco (FBI) 
Managed by: 
Individual 
Deloitte  
national 
headquarters 
around the 
world 
Managed by: 
PCW 
Sponsored by:  
Microsoft, 
Symantec, 
Entrust, 
ClearSwift 
Frequency Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Every 2 years 
Participant
s 
IT managers or 
equivalent,  
TISN members,  
A number of 
private and 
public sector 
industry groups 
CSO readers 
 
Information 
Security 
practitioners 
CISO 
CSO           
Designated  
Security  
managers 
ISF members and 
randomly picked 
U.K. businesses 
(the preferred 
contact person 
was not 
mentioned)  
Sample size 2024  
(389 responded) 
15 000  
(434 responded) 
5000  
(616 responded) 
250  
(81 responded) 
1001  
(1001 responded) 
+ Polls 
(unknown) 
Response 
rate 
17% 2.89% 12.3% 32.4% > 95% 
Survey 
method 
Mail hard-copy  
and  
Web-site 
E-mail Mail hard-copy  
and  
E-mail 
Face-to-face    
interviews and 
Web-site 
Face-to-face  and 
Phone interviews,  
E-mail polls  
THE CRITICISMS 
It is a reasonable assumption that the results of the surveys are only as good as the answers provided by the 
participants. In a perfect world security metrics would be implemented at every level of the systems and the 
participants would simply answer the survey questions based on those metrics. Unfortunately, this approach is 
fundamentally flawed as it relies on the assumption that the participants have in their possession, and are using, 
appropriate security metrics such as monitoring and audit results to complete the questionnaires. The 
methodologies did not provide proof that this was the case.  
This leads to the question of how do the participants answer the questions and do they have any biases when 
answering them? The surveys all fall short in addressing those issues. 
Furthermore, the scope of the questions goes beyond the technical metrics covered by monitoring and auditing 
systems. Many surveys now collect information on the financial losses resulting from attacks, the outcomes of 
reporting the events to law enforcement agencies and, sometimes, the short-term strategies implemented to 
improve security. For that information to be reflective of the company’s profile it is implied that the appropriate 
person will be answering those questions. 
Similarly, some questions attempt to measure the use of certain security technologies and their usefulness in 
preventing attacks. However, no basis is provided to ensure the proper implementation of those technologies. To 
illustrate this, 98% of the participants to AusCERT (2006, p. 8) claim to have anti-virus protection in place, yet 
more than 65% of them detected virus attacks. Does this mean that the remaining 35% experienced successful 
virus attacks, or did they not detect any attacks? Another factor to consider is the frequency of the virus 
definition updates which might differ from one organisation to another. The confusion could be due to the 
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wordiness of the questions, leaving the readers and the respondents unclear as to whether or not the aim is to 
measure the number of successful attacks, the number of detected attacks or simply the number of attempted 
attacks. 
There is a general lack of information on the methodologies. Walsh (2006) noted that the CSI/FBI 2006 survey 
response rate was just over 12% and questioned whether “the 12% who did answer differ in any other way from 
the 88% who did not?" Walsh asked. "We do not know, because the report doesn't tell us”.  
Ira Winkler (2006) strongly critiqued the CSI/FBI surveys. His arguments all relate to the methodologies and 
statistical validity of the results. He argues that the term ’attacks’ was broadly defined and that there was an 
implication that the technologies in use were meant to stop the broadly defined attacks. 
Winkler comments that “more than 50% of the respondents were from companies with less than $5 million in 
annual revenue”. Those results cannot be statistically generalised to the Fortune 2000 companies, only to 
companies with less than $5 million in annual revenue. 
He also highlights the false perception that security technology is ineffective. Garreston and Messmer (2006) 
agree with this, tagging the surveys as a great way of creating FUD (fear, uncertainty and doubt): “FUD created 
by survey results sends the message that you're never secure enough … be afraid, be very afraid”. FUD is a sales 
marketing or political strategy disseminating negative but vague or inaccurate information (CSO Online, 2003). 
“Let's face it: surveys for the security industry are created primarily for marketing purposes” (Winkler, 2006). 
Winkler’s statement gained increased credibility when IBM, in their Global Business Security Index, used the 
CSI/FBI 2005 survey numbers on insider attacks, shortly followed by the announcement of a new fraud 
detection capability that monitors users' online transactions for questionable activity (IBM, 2006),. 
Are the surveys so inaccurate and flawed that they should be rejected as a useful source of information? Winkler 
(2006) certainly thinks so as he advises his readers to “assure management that it has no valid implications for 
your business”. Whilst the lack of information associated with the surveys’ methodologies leads to similar 
conclusions, should such an opinionated mindset be adopted?  
The paper will now consider the surveys and their usefulness to business. 
SURVEY PURPOSES: MEASUREMENT TOOLS WITHIN A CONTEXT 
Three key reasons were identified as to why the surveys failed to pass the critics’ tests: 
• People have different notions of what constitutes risk, threat and vulnerability (Ames, 2007). 
• The surveys are an indicative measurement of security as it happens in a business context or a health 
check assessing you against the competition (Deloitte, 2006, p. 4). 
•  “So far no one has come up with a common, clear, straightforward way of measuring risk that applies 
or works equally well in all circumstances” (Ames, 2007). 
Whilst the definition of risk, threat, and vulnerability may vary from one individual to another, it is imperative to 
remember that the objectives of the surveys are to “help respondents assess the state of information security 
within their organization” (Deloitte, 2006, p. 4). This provides a very specific context that needs to be 
considered when defining the associated risks, threats and vulnerabilities. In turn, the risk profile of those 
organisations will play an equally important role. 
Most of the surveys address those issues. DTI (2006, p. 4) acknowledges that “businesses of different sizes tend 
to exhibit different security profiles”, and has attempted to address this issue by increasing the sample size of the 
most representative and predominant industry. By boosting the sample of the most representative and 
predominant industry, in their case sole traders and small SMEs, when the results for a large company 
significantly differed from the overall results, they were quoted separately. 
It is important that the survey questions and results should be interpreted in their intended context. With regard 
to this context, the surveys can be used as a risk measurement tool, as a justification to support security decision-
making and as a marketing argument for vendors. 
Risk measuring tool 
Measuring risk can be done in two ways; a qualitative one, as outlined by the Australian risk management 
standards (AS/NZS 4360:2004, 2004) using a model that rates risks as High, Medium, Low and a quantitative 
one that uses probabilities and statistics to measure losses and risks. The United States General Accounting 
Office explains that “efforts to develop precisely quantified risks are not cost-effective”; the amount of time and 
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effort involved in the process are simply too great. (GAO, p. 28). Qualitative measures on the other hand can be 
developed as a more granular and sophisticated approach. Using risk matrix representation facilitates the 
representation of the risk gradation levels based on their impacts and likelihood (Amos, 2007). 
In a business context, value is determined and represented by a monetary term. Managing risks represents an 
investment which can be measured. “So we should be able to relate measures of risk to the money we need to 
manage it” (Ames, 2007).  
In this respect every survey contained a measure of the financial gains, loss or value associated with IT Security. 
Each survey measured the following points: 
• Present and future budget allocation towards IT Security; 
• Financial expenses related to IT Security controls; 
• Investments made towards the improvement of IT Security; 
• Financial loss due to the measured incidents. 
Some measurements were more technical than others. CSI/FBI (2006) questioned its participants on the Return 
on Investment (ROI) engendered by IT Security controls. Similarly, Deloitte (2006) and DTI (2006) had 
questions dedicated to the monetary values associated with the outsourcing of security and insurance expenses.  
This is emphasised by the 2007 edition of the CSI/FBI survey which now contains a “business justification” 
section. “It has generally been believed that projects designed to increase an organization’s information security 
will not automatically be approved by senior management (e.g., by the CFO), but instead need to be justified in 
economic terms” (CSI/FBI, 2007, p. 8). Those measurements have been in the CSI survey since 2004; however, 
it is the first year that all economic arguments have been grouped into one section. These include the budgeting 
and financial management related measurements (loss, investments, cost-benefit measurements), insurance and 
outsourcing costs.  
A decision making tool 
KPMG Netherlands (2006, p. 8) argues that Information Systems are at the core of most companies, an integral 
part of their nervous system.  
It hardly requires explaining that organisations must take effective measures to control the security and 
continuity risks that come from using information and communication technology … Organisations that 
have the security and continuity of their systems in place do not need to worry about the risks. 
Yet their experience shows that managers and executives often overlook information security, treating it as an 
isolated phenomenon rather than an integrated part of the business.  With regard to those problems it is only 
logical that some IT managers use these surveys to help loosen the company purse strings to fund security 
projects. Could it be that the economic measurements included in those surveys are valuable to security despite 
the criticism? Michael Dean (cited in Garreston & Messmer, 2006), who supports a 50,000 computer network 
for 175,000 students and teaching staff in Palm Beach County School District Florida, states that he reluctantly 
support the points many of these surveys are making, “even though some of them make you cringe because 
they're so blatantly oriented toward selling products”.  
Jim Hite, supervisor of network services and central operations with Virginia's Prince William County schools 
(cited in Garreston & Messmer, 2006) explains, “surveys are one of the only benchmarks you can use to make 
decisions”. 
A marketing tool 
Questionnaire design can be a daunting task (Leedy, 1993; Trochim, 2006). Table 1 showed the existence of 
partnerships with influential sponsors such as Microsoft, Symantec and other large security vendors. Those 
relationships, other than being one of the critics’ favourite arguments, also seem to indicate the interest and 
endorsement of those studies by the industry and that they act as a quality improvement factor in some cases. 
AusCERT (2006, p.3) and DTI (2006, p.4) both provide indicators that such partnerships and industry 
involvement provided them with larger sample size, more rigour into the survey instrument itself and a more 
precise question design. 
On the other hand, it is only fair to acknowledge that vendors are sponsoring many of those surveys and no one 
expects to see results that would contradict or negate the need for one of their products. Equally, the surveys are 
also a tool for vendors to scan the market for guidance. In 2004, Proofpoint, through Forrester Research 
conducting a survey (Forrester, 2004), found that the results showed that 43% of companies sampled scanned 
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outbound e-mail for confidentiality breaches. A few months later Proofpoint released an outbound compliance 
solution that automated the scanning process (Proofpoint, 2005) 
Keith Crosley, director of market development with Proofpoint (cited in Garreston & Messmer, 2006), mitigated 
the critics: "There's always a self-serving aspect to anything a vendor releases … but we really are trying to 
educate markets and share interesting data that helps people make really intelligent decisions about their 
technology investments".  
However, it is not only the vendors who use the surveys as a marketing tool. IT and Information Security staff 
can use the results to support their business cases for new security-related systems and products. “As highlighted 
in the survey, they have to make their case: security professionals are increasingly being asked to develop 
detailed business cases to justify new investments in technologies they need to address the constantly evolving 
threat.” (CSI/FBI, 2006, p.22).  
Interpretation of the Results 
The previous section raised the issue of the survey results influencing vendors. However, this is only useful if 
the interpretation of the results is correct (or if you have a product to sell that addresses the problems identified 
in the survey). One of the noticeable trends over the past few years is the change in the source of the reported 
attacks. Until recently the majority of the attacks were reported as coming from the inside, not the outside, of an 
organisation. Over the last few years this bias has shifted from internal to external. Various explanations are 
given, such as increased security, increased security awareness, better functioning security measures and the 
effect of the Sarbannes-Oxley Act, to name a few (CSI/FBI, 2006). 
There is another explanation that is rarely mentioned in the analysis of the surveys. There have been two major 
trends in the states and countries covered by the surveys in the past seven years. The first is the increase in 
Broadband for home use (Horrigan, 2006). The second is the increase in availability of corporate systems over 
the Internet and, as a side-effect of this, the increase in employees working from home, often (but not always) 
using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to access internal corporate systems. The Office of National Statistics in 
the UK states that the number of people working from home doubled between 1997 and 2005 (Security Park, 
2007). These changes mean that internal staff, contractors and others, now have the opportunity to abuse an 
organisation’s systems remotely rather than when they are at their desks and possibly under scrutiny. The 
National Threat Assessment Center of the U.S. Secret Service undertook an Insider Threat Study (Capelli et al, 
2005) in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University. The findings 
showed that “30% of the incidents took place at the home of the insider using remote access to the organization's 
network”; “only 17% of the insider events studied involved individuals with administrator access”; and “87% of 
the attacks used very simple user commands that didn't require any advanced knowledge”. This also was found 
in other surveys and Kevin Beaver stated in the online Information Security Magazine that “A considerable 
amount of insider abuse is performed offsite via remote access software”. He continued “Simply put, users are 
less likely to be caught stealing sensitive information when they can it do offsite.” What is worrying about this is 
expressed by Insider Threat Study (Capelli et al, 2005) when they say that “the majority of the insider attacks 
were only detected once there was a noticeable irregularity in the information system or a system became 
unavailable.”  Also the fact that “remote access was used to carry out the majority of the attacks” and that these 
“insider activities caused organizations financial losses, negative impacts to their business operations and 
damage to their reputations.”  
These findings could indicate why the percentage of insider attacks has been overtaken by outsider attacks in 
many of the surveys. In fact it is the classification that is questionable. Should an attack from outside of the 
organisation physically be classed as an external attack if it is perpetrated by insiders acting remotely? This is 
further confused if you consider the use of a VPN. 
Another problem in trying to analyse the trend from internal to external attacks is that the method of reporting 
insider and outsider attacks varied not only between the different surveys but also from year to year in the same 
surveys. Some report the percentage of insider versus outsider attacks; for example, the CSO survey in 2005 
reported that 80% of the attacks reported were external and 20% internal; however, in 2006 they reported that 
55% of the respondents had reported internal attacks and 58% had reported external attacks. In 2007 the survey 
question asked who caused more damage, insiders or outsiders? The “results were fairly close (insiders 34%, 
outsiders 37%, unknown 29%)” (CSO magazine et al, 2007). This makes it harder to use these statistics to 
recognise trends.   
What comes through strongly in the surveys is that the number of incidents has dropped but the cost of those 
incidents has risen, as illustrated by the title of the 2006 E-Crime Watch Survey Summary, “Survey shows E-
crime incidents are declining yet impact is increasing” (E-Crime Watch Survey, 2006).  
Proceedings of The 5th Australian Information Security Management Conference 
 
 
Page  70  
Again this could be explained if the ‘external’ attacks were actually being perpetrated by internal personnel who 
have the knowledge to know what, where and how to attack the organisation so as to gain most benefit. This is a 
difficult issue as it relates to trust issues with employees, but is also their families (and friends) who may be 
using the same computer over which the organisation has little control. Kevin Cheek, vice president of marketing 
at Reconnex stated that “No one is discussing the risks of remote access because every business routinely gives 
it to trusted employees, partners, consultants, and other third parties, but businesses really don’t know what 
users are accessing or viewing,” (Cheek, 2006).  He continued by raising the issue of the need to monitor all 
SSL or IPSec VPN connections into corporate networks as organisations need to know where their staff are 
“going and what files they’re touching.”  
Bruce Schneier (2005) commented on the issues raised in a survey conducted by ICM Research in various 
European countries. He stated that the results would be equally applicable in the US and probably elsewhere, 
(such as Australia). The survey found that 21% of workers let family and friends use their PCs to access the 
Internet, “51% connected their own devices” to them and a quarter of them do it every day. 60% stored 
personal content on them and 62% “admitted they have a very limited knowledge of IT security”. As with some 
of the other studies a security firm, in this case McAfee, had an interest in the study, however, that should not 
negate the general findings of the surveys. 
CONCLUSION 
A mix of local and internationally conducted surveys was reviewed. Some were openly sponsored by vendors, 
others outsourced to professional survey services. Their methodologies, highly criticised by security 
professionals, supplied too little information to disprove their detractors.  However, over recent years the 
surveys have been subject to continuous improvement. Recent changes included more business-oriented metrics 
applied to risk measurement and the search for larger and more appropriate samples. Further improvements are 
coming from the Deloitte and DTI surveys, which outline comprehensive methodologies, a closer focus to 
certain industries and in-person interviews. 
Winkler (2006) argued that management should be reassured that survey results have no valid implications for 
their business. Others question the interpretation of the results and their implications for business and 
government. Overall it would be preferable to think that security professionals are able to use the findings from 
the surveys for the good of security within their organisation regardless of these criticisms. This includes 
valuing security improvements primarily by leveraging the existing tools to their advantage, including 
information security surveys. This is good practice and, if applied well, can be a powerful driver for both 
business and its information security. This is none other than good Governance through risk management, 
performance evaluation and even strategic alignment by benchmarking your company’s results against a global 
scale. 
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